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This study aims to describe the effect of sanctions (individual sanctions, collective sanctions, 
and absence of sanctions) on cooperative behavior of individuals with medium trust in the con-
text of corruption. Both collective sanctions and individual sanctions, are systemic, which 
means sanctioning behavior is exercised not by each individual but by the system. Cooperative 
behavior in this context means choosing to obey rules, to reject acts of corruption and to prio-
ritize public interests rather than the personal interests. Conversely, corruption is an uncoo-
perative behavior to the rules, and ignores the public interest and prioritizes personal interests. 
Research subjects were 62 students. The Chi-Square Analysis was used to see the association 
between the variables and the logistic regression model was applied to describe the structure 
of this association. Individual sanction is recommended as punishment to medium trust indi-
viduals to promote cooperative behavior in the context of corruption. The results showed that 
individuals with medium trust had more cooperative behavior. 
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Studi ini bertujuan memeriksa pengaruh pemberian sanksi (sanksi individual, sanksi kolektif, 
dan tanpa sanksi) terhadap perilaku kooperatif individu dengan medium trust dalam konteks 
korupsi. Baik sanksi kolektif maupun sanksi individual, bersifat sistemik, yang berarti bahwa 
pemberian sanksi tidak dilakukan oleh individu masing-masing, tetapi oleh sistem. Perilaku 
kooperatif dalam konteks ini dimaknai sebagai perilaku menaati aturan, menolak tindakan 
korupsi, mengutamakan kepentingan umum dibandingkan kepentingan pribadi. Sebaliknya, 
korupsi adalah perilaku tidak kooperatif terhadap aturan, mengabaikan kepentingan umum 
dan mengutamakan kepentingan pribadi. Studi ini melibatkan 62 mahasiswa. Uji Chi-Square 
digunakan untuk melihat asosiasi antar-variabel dan model regresi logistik digunakan untuk 
menggambarkan struktur hubungan tersebut. Sanksi individual direkomendasikan untuk me-
ningkatkan perilaku kooperatif individu dengan medium trust pada konteks korupsi. Hasil mem-
perlihatkan bahwa individu dengan medium trust menunjukkan perilaku kooperatif lebih banyak. 
 
Kata kunci: perilaku kooperatif, general trust, sanksi, korupsi 
 
 
The construction of state-owned facilities is aimed 
at the prosperity of the people. The facilities financed 
from regional governmental budgets (Anggaran Pen-
dapatan dan Belanja Daerah - APBD) or the National 
Budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Nasional 
- APBN) should be utilized by the whole of society. 
Unfortunately, efficient governance and public pros-
perity is difficult to achieve, because of corruption. 
The discovery of corruption committed by business-
man (private sector), involving government employees, 
in Indonesia, is not rare. An example is the way a busi-
nessman and one or more government employees col-
lude to win a tender. In order to win such a tender, they 
involve the tender committee. As a participant in the 
project tendering process, the businessman offers a 
bribe to a government employee. In return for the bribe 
received, the government employee abuses his autho-
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Wilis 
Srisayekti, Faculty of Psychology Universitas Padjadjaran. Jalan Raya 
Bandung-Sumedang KM 21. E-mail: wilis_bandung@yahoo.com 
 
brought to you by COREView metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
provided by Jurnal Online Universitas Surabaya
 SANCTION ON COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR 25 
 
rity, to ensure the businessman wins the tender, by ma-
king a deal with the tender committee. This pheno-
menon was found, for example, in a case in Hulu Su-
ngai Tengah District. The alleged corrupt acts invol-
ved bribery, offered to ensure the procurement of the 
Damanhuri Hospital maintenance contract, in 2017. 
The suspected recipient was the Chief of the Hulu Su-
ngai Tengah District during the period 2016-2021. 
A second example involved allegations of corrup-
tion related to the Bobong Airport land acquisition, 
in the Sula Islands Regency APBD of 2009. The sus-
pects were the Regent of Sula Islands Regency during 
the period 2005-2010, and the Chairman of the Regi-
onal Peoples’ Representative Council (Dewan Perwa-
kilan Rakyat Daerah - DPRD) of Sula Islands Regency 
for the period 2009-2014. A third case involved alle-
gations of corruption regarding the bribery of judges 
on the bench of the Tangerang State Court (Penga-
dilan Negeri - PN). The suspects were two judges and 
two lawyers (KPK Tetapkan Delapan Tersangka, 2018). 
The Statistical data from the Corruption Eradica-
tion Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi - 
KPK), showed that, as at 2018, the professions record-
ed as having the highest levels of corruption were those 
of politicians, government officials and private sec-
tor individuals (KPK, 2018). Running an efficient go-
vernment requires cooperative behavior from various 
parties, both from government employees and from 
the community, requiring people to be faithful to their 
responsibilities and to support law enforcement. 
Corruption, from the perspective of cooperative be-
havior in the context of corruption, is considered to 
be uncooperative behavior regarding compliance with 
the rules, and behaviors which ignore the public in-
terest and prioritize self interest. Cooperative beha-
vior in the context of corruption is considered to be 
behavior which complies with the rules, which rejects 
corrupt behavior, and which prioritizes the interests 
of the public, rather than of the self. Cooperative be-
havior involves "giving" behavior for public good, and 
"not taking too much" from shared resources (Van 
Lange, 2014). According to Parks, Joireman, and Van 
Lange (2013) this cooperative behavior is described 
as participatory behavior in the joint interests of the 
individual and the public. Participation can occur in 
two types of situation. The first type is related to the 
public good. This is a situation when the individual in 
the group depends entirely or partly on the contribu-
tion to be given by the entire membership of the group. 
In this situation the individual makes a sacrifice in the 
short-term (that is, by contributing) to realize long-
term benefits for him or herself, and in the public in-
terest. However, because anyone may use the facili-
ties provided (from the contributions of all), there is 
a temptation for the individual not to make a contri-
bution, but none the less to capitalize upon the faci-
lities. This situation creates a conflict between doing 
what is best for oneself and doing what is best for the 
group. 
The second type of situation is related to a common-
pool resource problem, or common resource problem. 
All members of society may utilize natural resources. 
However, such natural resources are limited, and may 
be exhausted quickly, if they are not well managed. 
This is the reason the use of these natural resources 
needs to be well managed. Every individual in society 
should participate in this effort, by obeying the rules 
which manage the sustainability of these natural resour-
ces. In this situation the individual may face a conflict 
between choosing short-term benefits (behaving sel-
fishly, taking natural resources for him or herself, with-
out much concern for others) or choosing to prioritize 
the long-term needs of the group, of society in general. 
Various studies on cooperative behavior have empha-
sized how it can be promoted and become a solution 
for the achievement of the common good. Some stu-
dies worthy of mention are, for example, those on pro-
environmental behavior (Irwin & Berigan, 2013), on 
energy conservation, on donation of blood, and on the 
use of environmentally friendly vehicles (Attari, Krantz, 
& Weber, 2016), on mass transportation (van Lange, 
van Vugt, Meertens, & Ruiter, 1998), and on anti-cor-
ruption efforts (Chen, Jiang, & Villeval, 2016; Kobis, 
van Prooijen, Righetti, & van Lange, 2016). 
Various factors influence cooperative behavior. One 
of the influencing psychological factors is trust, which 
in the present study refers to medium levels of gene-
ral trust, Trust is essential to the initiation, building 
and maintenance of social relationships. Trust supports 
the establishment of cooperative behavioral relation-
ships (McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998), fa-
cilitating relationships within groups (de Jong & Elfring, 
2010), within organizations (McEvily, Perrone , & Zaheer, 
2003), and between countries (Knack & Keefer, 1997). 
Trust is the “social glue” of relationships, groups, and 
society. Trust connects individuals, and also facilitates 
thought, motivation, and behavior, which promotes 
cooperation towards collective goals. Trust can improve 
the stability and quality of social networks, by streng-
thening norms which support cooperative behavior 
and by helping new members of a group to accelerate 
their adjustment that particular social network (Balliet 
& Van Lange, 2013). 
In general, individuals vary in their trust of others  
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(Rotter, 1967, Yamagishi, 2011). There are some dif-
ferences between individuals who are considered to 
have high levels of trust, and those who are considered 
to have low levels of trust. The first difference rela-
tes to the sensitivity of the individuals in receiving 
information. As compared to individuals commanding 
low levels of trust, those commanding high levels are 
more sensitive to relevant information about the trust-
worthiness of others (about the extent to which others 
have credible traits). Those with higher trust more qu-
ickly adjust their level of confidence to certain tar-
gets, reflecting relevant information, than those with 
low trust (Kosugi & Yamagishi, 1996; Rotter, 1980; 
Yamagishi, Kikuchi, & Kosugi, 1999). Secondly, there 
are differences in social and health behaviors, between 
people considered to have high levels of trust, and those 
considered to have low levels. “High trust”, as com-
pared to “low trust” individuals, tend to behave coo-
peratively in confronting uncertainty and conflicts of 
interest, to participate more in charitable activities, to 
have higher life satisfaction, to exhibit better physical he-
alth, and even to live longer lives (Balliet & Van Lange, 
2013; Barefoot, Beckham, Brummett, & Maynard, 1998; 
Holmes & Rempel, 1989; Simpson, 2007; Yamagishi, 
2011). 
While “high trust” and “low trust” individuals have 
been studied widely, and it is well known how they 
demonstrate cooperative behavior (see, for example, 
Balliet & Van Lange, 2013; Irwin & Berigan, 2013; 
Yamagishi, Akutsu, Cho, Inoue, Li, & Matsumoto, 
2015), as far as is known, there has not been any re-
search conducted on the cooperative behavior of indi-
viduals deemed to have medium levels of trust, espe-
cially in the context of corruption. Studies concerning 
the cooperative behavior of individuals deemed to have 
medium levels of trust are important, because the num-
ber of individuals with medium levels of trust is high-
er than the number of “high trust” and “low trust” in-
dividuals. For example, the results from research by 
Rosiana (2018) showed that the number of individuals 
deemed to have medium levels of trust was 74.54%, 
(N = 1658, Mage = 20.40, SDage = 1.89, female 64%). 
The study was conducted in Bandung, Central Java, 
Indonesia. The question is whether the cooperative 
behavior of the individuals deemed to have medium 
levels of general trust, in the context of corruption, 
tends to have any similarity with that of individuals 
deemed to have high and low levels of trust. This in-
formation is particularly important for promoting co-
operative behavior in those individuals deemed to have 
medium levels of general trust, that is the majority of 
individuals in society. 
Trust, Cooperative Behavior and Corruption 
 
The relationship between trust and cooperative be-
havior varies across countries (Balliet & Van Lange, 
2013). They stated that, in some countries, trust has 
strong positive relationships with cooperative beha-
vior (the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK), but 
in other countries the relationship between trust and 
cooperative behavior is weak (for example, Canada, 
Singapore and the United States). Moreno (2002) men-
tions a positive relationship between trust and econo-
mic development and democracy. Furthermore, there 
is a negative correlation between tolerance of corrup-
tion and the level of trust. This suggests that, in gene-
ral, people with higher trust tend to be less likely to 
justify, or to tolerate, corruption, and, conversely, peo-
ple with low levels of trust tend to be highly likely to 
justify or tolerate corruption. In accord with Moreno 
& Putnam (as cited in Uslaner, 2002) argues that cor-
ruption and trust are at odds with each other. Trust is 
the foundation of the spirit of cooperative behavior, 
which is the moral sentiment driving people to work 
with others, whilst corruption is a form of selfishness. 
Trust encourages giving, and performing voluntary 
work, whilst corruption leads to the usurpation of the 
property rights of others. In addition, trust and cor-
ruption arise from fundamentally different views of 
life. Trust is based on an optimistic view of the world. 
Seligman (1991) states that one who trusts others be-
lieves that the world is a good place, and will conti-
nue to get better, and that he or she can help make the 
world a better place. According to Uslaner (2004), the 
commission of corrupt behavior is based on the view 
of people who steal because they value comfort. 
 
Sanctions and Cooperation 
 
Sanctions effectively increase cooperative behavior 
in situations of social dilemma (Eek, Loukopoulos, 
Fujii, & Gärling, 2002; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Van 
Vugt & De Cremer, 1999). In numerous situations of 
social dilemma in society, sanctioning systems are in-
troduced and applied to make people cooperate. The 
most obvious reason why sanctioning systems may 
increase cooperation is that they make defection less 
attractive and, as such, change the reward structure 
of a social dilemma. However, there are also studies 
showing the negative sides of sanctions. Such studies 
have focused mainly on the motives for cooperation, 
such as frames, norms, expectations and trust, rather 
than the cooperative behavior itself. Tenbrunsel and 
Messick (1999) showed that sanctions made people 
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frame their decisions regarding social dilemmas as bu-
siness decisions, rather than as ethical decisions. The 
results of their studies showed that sanctions occasi-
oned cooperation, and that the expectations for coo-
peration decreased when the sanction was minimal. 
When the sanction was large enough to make coope-
ration unattractive, it increased cooperation. Mulder, 
Van Dijk, De Cremer, and Wilke (2006) showed that 
sanction systems in situations of social dilemma harm 
the trust by which fellow group members are inter-
nally motivated to cooperate. 
There are two types of sanctions, based on the party 
who executes them, namely peer sanctions and sys-
temic sanctions (centralized punishment). Peer sanc-
tions are imposed by fellow participants, on partici-
pants who are declared to have violated the rules of 
their groups (for example, Fehr & Gachter, 1999). Sys-
temic sanctions were imposed by someone outside the 
participants in the study, usually the researcher him 
or herself, on participants who were declared to have 
violated the rules in the group (for example, Mulder, 
Verboon, & Cremer, 2009). This type of outside-im-
posed sanction is also commonly referred to as a “pu-
nishment based on the system”. Systemic sanctions 
are more effective in complex communities, where-
in control systems are often carried out centrally. For 
example, people do not sanction their neighbors be-
cause of speed-limit violations, because the police (as 
the central authority) do so. Studies on the effectiveness 
of centralized sanctions (systemic sanctions) have show-
ed the causal effects of legitimacy on cooperative beha-
vior, in which the participants were more responsive to 
the authority of the selected monitor than the random-
ly selected monitor (Baldassarri & Grossman, 2011). 
 
Research Objectives 
 
The present study aimed to examine the effects of 
sanctions on the cooperative behavior of individuals 
with medium levels of general trust in the context of 
corruption. Investigated was conducted into whether 
the sanction type and the degree of cooperative beha-
vior were independent one of the other, or whether 
they were, in some way, associated. The study also 
examined the types of sanction(s) which were effec-
tive in improving cooperative behavior. 
 
 
Methods 
 
The present study used an experimental method in 
a laboratory setting. The dependent variable was coo-
perative behavior, and the independent variable was 
sanctions (at three levels, that is, individual sanctions, 
collective sanctions, and absence of sanctions). 
 
Participants 
 
The participants in the present study were 62 un-
dergraduate students 19 to 21 years old (M = 19.35; 
SD = 1.79) of the Faculty of Psychology at a private 
university in Bandung, Indonesia, 47 (75.8%) of whom 
were female, The participants involved in this study 
were free to withdraw voluntarily, whenever they so 
desired. The participants were recruited through invi-
tations to participate in research, broadcast via social 
media. Within seven days of the posting of the invi-
tations, 94 students replied and expressed their inte-
rest in participating in the study. After biodata and suita-
bility regarding the research schedule was determined, 
62 students were selected to participate in the study. 
 
Measurement 
 
General Trust was measured using the Inclusive Ge-
neral Trust Scale, by Yamagishi et al. (2015). The au-
thors obtained permission from Yamagishi to adapt 
this measurement tool, this being received by electro-
nic mail on June 4, 2017. The Inclusive General Trust 
Scale consists of nine items. Five items measure as-
pect of the belief of others trustworthiness (for exam-
ple, “Most people are basically honest,”), and four i-
tems measure aspect of preference for trust (that is, 
positive evaluations of acting in a trustful manner) (for 
example, “I hate to lose because of having counted on 
someone.”) The results of applying the Rank Spear-
man correlation for all items were between .291 and 
.631, meaning all items were usable, and also were re-
liable (α = .83). This self-reporting questionnaire had 
response categories ranging from 1 (= distrust com-
pletely) to 5 (= trust completely). There were three ca-
tegories used regarding general trust, based on score 
scales. The calculation employed SPSS 21 software, 
and obtained values for Mean and Standard Deviations 
for low trust (X < 25.68), medium trust (25.68 ≤ X ≤ 
33.12), high trust (X > 33.12). 
Cooperative behavior was measured via online com-
puter simulation, adapted from a corruption game de-
signed by Köbis, van Prooijen, Righetti, and Van Lange 
(2015). Köbis gave the authors a soft file, and permis-
sion to adapt the corruption game, by electronic mail 
received on May 6, 2017. 
In summary, of the experimental materials used co-
vered the following scenario. The participants play-
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ed the role of the CEO (Chief Executive Officer) of 
a construction company, Construx. In the game, Con-
strux is tendering for large construction contracts, ad-
vertised and allocated by the Public Works Department 
and Spatial Management Agency, of Godam City. At 
this stage of the procurement procedure there are only 
two construction companies eligible to do the work, 
Construx and Roley (the only competitor). The par-
ticipants, as the CEO of Construx, have to decide whe-
ther to submit a low-cost tender (which would mean 
low development costs and low quality work) or an 
expensive tender (which would mean expensive ca-
pital development costs and good quality work, where 
every detail is laid out, and sketches and bridge mo-
dels developed in detail). 
The project going to tender consists of five deve-
lopment stages, divided into five rounds of tendering. 
At each round of the tendering process, the partici-
pants have to decide how much money they intend to 
allocate for the bridge building contract for the Public 
Works Department and Spatial Planning Agency. The 
participants are then given the bidding corruption sce-
nario; as follows. “You have friends who are very close 
to the Head of the Public Works Department and Spa-
tial Planning Agency of Godam City, so you have a 
unique opportunity to invite him to take a vacation to 
Paris on the corporate budget. If you invite him to take 
a vacation in Paris, then your company (Construx) will 
be selected as the winner of the tender in all five ro-
unds. Would you like to invite the Head of the Public 
Works Department and Spatial Planning Agency of 
Godam City to take a holiday in Paris on the corpo-
rate budget?” The responses are: (1) “No, I will not 
invite him.” - resulting in the construction tender be-
ing awarded to the highest bidder; (2) “Yes, I will in-
vite him.”, - resulting in the tender being given to your 
company (Construx) in all (five) rounds of the tender. 
The answer to this question is then taken to imply co-
operative behavior (answer ‘No’), or uncooperative 
behavior (answer ‘Yes’). The participants are given 
five questions to confirm their understanding of the 
instructions (for example, “If you, as the CEO of Con-
strux, offer EUR 50,000, and Roley, the other com-
pany, offers EUR 40,000, who gets the job?”). If any 
participants answer the question wrongly, they have 
a second chance to answer correctly (the participants 
answered 92% of the questions correctly, at the first 
trial). 
 
Sanctions 
 
The authors used a design allowing examination  
of whether or not the participants were able to coope-
rate with one another. In this design, there was the op-
portunity for the participants to cooperate, in order to 
avoid sanctions. The authors adapted the design from 
Chen, Jiang, and Villeval (2016), who investigated 
corruption as a social dilemma, by means of using a 
game based upon bribery. In this game, the risk of col-
lective sanctions against public officials was introdu-
ced when the number of officials accepting bribes from 
firms reached a certain threshold. In the current expe-
riment, each participant received a coupon which could 
be redeemed for IDR 25,000. The sanction, in the form 
of a monetary deduction, was 80% of IDR 25,000, so 
that participants on whom such a sanction was impo-
sed would receive only IDR 5,000. Sanctions were im-
posed if at least 20% of the participants (in 10 person 
groups) chose uncooperative behavior (bribing the head 
of the department/agency, by giving him a vacation 
ticket to Paris). Thus, sanctions were applied when 
three or more from the 10 person group of participants 
chose uncooperative behavior. In this experiment, sys-
temic sanctions were applied. The sanctions were im-
posable at three levels, with the following operational 
definitions for each level: At the level of “individual 
sanctions,” sanctions were imposed on only those par-
ticipants who chose to engage in uncooperative beha-
vior (bribing the head of the department/agency, by 
way of giving him a vacation ticket to Paris). At the 
level of “collective sanctions”, such sanctions were 
imposed on all participants in the group, whether they 
chose to engage in uncooperative behavior (bribing 
the head of the department/agency by providing holi-
day tickets to Paris), or rather chose cooperative beha-
vior. At the level of “absence of sanctions”, the par-
ticipants were not given any information relating to 
sanctions, and there was no sanction imposed. 
 
Procedure 
 
There were two experimental stages in this research. 
At the first stage, general trust was measured using 
only the participants deemed to have a medium level 
of trust. The participants were divided randomly into 
three groups. The group which was subject to collec-
tive sanctions comprised 20 participants, the group 
subject to individual sanctions comprised 21 partici-
pants, and the group of not subject to any sanction con-
sisted of 21 participants. 
In the second stage, cooperative behavior was mea-
sured through an online computer simulation, access-
ed by opening the specified address. The participants 
were each provided an individual computer. They were 
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instructed that there was a group of 10 people work-
ing together on the simulation, and that their choices 
would have impacts on the other group members. The 
instruction, that there was a group of people, and that 
their choice of answers would have an impact on their 
fellow group members, was an adaptation for exami-
ning cooperative behavior, in the context of corrup-
tion. The participants were given the story scenario. 
The simulation lasted for 30 minutes. 
 
Data Analysis Technique 
 
Data were summarized into 3 x 2 contingency ta-
bles, with the categorizing of participants according 
to their cooperative, or uncooperative, behavior res-
ponses to three sanction treatments: individual sanc-
tions, collective sanctions, and the absence of sanc-
tions. The question of interest in the present study was, 
whether the rates of cooperative responses and uncoo-
perative responses were the same. The authors address-
ed this question by investigating whether there was 
a statistical association, between treatment and out-
come. The null hypothesis stated that there was no as-
sociation between sanctions and outcomes. To test this 
statistical hypothesis, the authors used Chi-Squared 
statistics and likelihood-ratio statistics. 
Further analysis was needed, to assess the strength 
of any association between sanction type and the co-
operative behavior of participants, as a response. In 
this analysis, the authors used one measure of asso-
ciation, the odds ratio. The odds ratio figures result-
ed from the use of the logistic regression model. This 
demonstrated the relationship between the categorical 
response variables and a set of explanatory variables. 
In this study, the response variable was cooperative 
behavior, which was rated at two different response 
levels (cooperative and the uncooperative). The ex-
planatory variable was the sanction type, which had 
three different response levels: individual sanctions, 
collective sanctions, and the absence of sanctions. One 
of the advantages was that the model interpretation 
was possible through the odds ratios, which were the 
functions of the model parameters. Data were process-
ed using the IBM Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences, Version 17. 
 
 
Results 
 
Table 1 presents the results from the 62 participants, 
who took part in the research as individuals with me-
dium levels of trust. They were undergraduate students 
of the Faculty of Psychology, of a private university 
in Bandung, Central Java. Table 1 depicts the cross 
classifications of behavior (two levels, that is, coope-
rative behavior and uncooperative behavior) by sanc-
tion type (three levels, that is, individual sanctions, col-
lective sanctions, and the absence of sanction) in the 
context of corruption. 
In general, regardless of the sanction type, the ten-
dency of individuals with medium levels of trust to 
show cooperative behavior was higher (34 participants, 
54.84%) than that of those demonstrating uncoopera-
tive behavior (28 participants, 45.16%). These findings 
revealed that the tendency of individuals demonstra-
ting medium levels of trust to behave cooperatively 
when facing uncertainty and a conflict of interests, was 
similar to the tendency of individuals deemed to have 
high levels of trust to show cooperative behavior (Balliet 
& Van Lange, 2013; Yamagishi, 2011). 
The percentage of individuals having medium le-
vels of trust, facing individual sanctions, who demon-
strated cooperative behavior, was higher (13 partici-
pants, 21%) than that of those who showed uncoope-
rative behavior (seven participants, 11.3%). Different 
results were shown by the individuals having medium 
levels of trust, who were facing collective sanctions. 
The percentage of those who behaved uncooperatively 
was higher (15 participants, 24.19%) than that of those 
who behaved cooperatively (six participants, 9.67%). 
The individuals having medium levels of trust, and not 
threatened with sanctions, had similar tendencies to 
those who faced individual sanctions. The percentage 
of those who behaved cooperatively was higher (15 
participants, 24.19%) than that of those who behaved 
uncooperatively (six participants, 9.67%). 
 
Table 1 
Cross Classification of Participant Behavior by Sanction Type 
Sanction Type 
Cooperative Sanction 
Total 
Cooperative (f, %) Uncooperative (f, %) 
Individual Sanctions 13 (21%) 7 (11.3%) 20 (32.25%) 
Collective Sanctions 6 (9.67%) 15 (24.19%) 21 (33.87%) 
Absence of Sanction 15 (24.19%) 6 (9.67%) 21 (33.87%) 
Total 34 (54.83%) 28 (45.16%) 62 (100%) 
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There was a question to be statistically tested in the 
present study, namely whether sanction type and co-
operative behavior were associated. Also to be tested 
was whether the proportion of cooperative behavior 
by participants in the present study who were consi-
dered to be individuals having medium levels of trust, 
subject to individual sanctions, different from the pro-
portion of cooperative behavior from those who faced 
no sanction, and if the proportion of the cooperative 
behavior of the participants, in the present study, who 
were considered to be individuals having medium le-
vels of trust, subject to collective sanctions, was dif-
ferent from the proportion of the cooperative behavior 
of those who facing no sanctions. These questions were 
answered by statistical examination of the association 
between the sanction type and cooperative behavior. 
The null hypothesis stated, H0: “There was no asso-
ciation between sanction type and cooperative beha-
vior.” There were several ways for testing the hypo-
thesis (that is, by using Pearson Chi-Square statistics 
and by using Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square statistics.) 
The results of the hypothesis testing are presented in 
Table 2. 
Table 2 shows that the value resulting from Pear-
son Chi-Square analysis was 9.018 (with df = 2, and 
p-value = .011), and the value resulting from Likeli-
hood Ratio Chi-Square analysis was 9.216 (with df 
= 2, and p-value = .010). These results indicated that 
the hypothesis testing was statistically significant, and 
that the null hypothesis was therefore rejected, mean-
ing that there was an association between the sanction 
type and cooperative behavior. 
In addition to the examination of the statistical as-
sociation between sanction type and cooperative be-
havior, the strength of the association was also exa-
mined. A logistic regression model was used to de-
scribe the structure of this association. It was a mo-
deling strategy which associated the logistic regres-
sion to a set of explanatory variables, using a linear 
model. One of the benefits of using the logistic regres-
sion model was that the odds ratios (OR), the impor-
tant measure of the association, was obtainable from 
the parameter estimate. A maximum likelihood esti-
mate was used to provide those estimates. The para-
meter estimate of the logistic regression model is pre-
sented in Table 3. 
In the model applied in the current research, there 
was only one effect, or one explanatory variable, which 
was the sanction type, which was rated at three levels 
(individual sanctions, collective sanctions, and absence 
of sanctions). To determine whether the association 
between the responses and the explanatory variable 
in the model was statistically significant, p-value was 
used to test the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis 
was stated, H0: “The parameter of the term was equal 
to zero, indicating that there was no association be-
tween the parameter and the responses. The signifi-
cant level (denoted as α or alpha) of .05 usually work-
ed well. The level of significance was defined as the 
probability of rejecting a null hypothesis by the test, 
if the hypothesis was actually true. A Wald Chi-Square 
analysis was applied, to test the null hypothesis. 
The results of the model testing are presented in Ta-
ble 3, which describes the parameter estimate of the 
logistic regression model. The effects of the “indivi-
dual sanctions” level in the model were significant, 
being at the level of .05 (p-value = .007), whereas the 
effects of the “collective sanctions” level in the model 
were not significant, being at the .05 level (p-value = .659). 
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the expla-
natory variable in this study (the sanction type) was 
rated at three levels (that is, individual sanctions, col-
lective sanctions, the absence of sanctions), and it was 
measured on a nominal scale. For the purposes of the 
analysis, the computation, and its interpretation, it was 
necessary to have a coding for the explanatory vari-
ables. Therefore, it was required to have a set of de-
sign variables to describe the categories of those vari-
Table 2 
Results of Chi-Square Analysis 
Methods Value df p-value 
Pearson Chi-Square 9.018 2 0.011 
Likelihood Ratio 9.216 2 0.010 
 
Table 3 
Parameter Estimate of Logistic Regression Model 
Parameter Estimate Standard Error Wald Chi-Square df p-value Odds Ratio 
Intercept - 0.916 .483 3.598 1 .058 0.400 
Sanction   8.335 2 .015  
Individual sanction 1.833 .683 7.196 1 .007 6.250 
Collective sanction 0.297 .673 0.195 1 .659 1.346 
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ables. Table 4 explains the method for specifying the 
design variables involving the compilation of all the 
arrangements. In this design, there was a level of sanc-
tions which had a code equal to zero (that is, the con-
trol level), and there was another level of sanctions 
having a code equal to one. In the current study, the 
control level, or level of reference, was the level of ab-
sence of sanctions. The parameter of individual sanc-
tion was a comparison of the probability between the 
successfulness of the level of “individual sanctions”, 
with the “absence of sanctions” level. The parameter of 
“collective sanctions” was a comparison of the probabi-
lity between the successfulness of the level of “collec-
tive sanctions” with the level of “absence of sanctions”. 
The odds ratio regarding “individual sanctions” (see 
Table 3) compared the probability of receiving coo-
perative behavior from the individuals having medium 
levels of trust, subject to individual sanctions, with the 
probability of receiving cooperative behavior from the 
individuals having medium levels of trust, who faced 
no sanction (absence of sanctions). The odds ratio re-
garding “collective sanctions” (see Table 3), compa-
red the probability of receiving cooperative behavior 
from the individuals having medium levels of trust 
and facing collective sanctions, with the probability 
of receiving cooperative behavior from the individuals 
having medium levels of trust , who faced no sanction. 
The value of the probability ratio (the odds ratio, OR) 
ranged from zero to infinity. When the OR was 1, this 
meant that there was no association between the vari-
ables in the row and the variables in the column. When 
the OR was greater than 1, as compared to the parti-
cipants facing collective sanctions, the participants 
subject to individual sanctions were more likely to give 
the response ‘Yes’, indicating uncooperative behavior 
(see experimental materials). When the OR was less 
than 1, as compared to the participants facing collec-
tive sanctions, the participants facing individual sanc-
tions were less likely to give the response ‘Yes’, indica-
ting uncooperative behavior (see experimental materials). 
As presented in Table 3, this study found that the 
estimated odds ratio was obtained by exponentiating 
the regression estimate. The estimated odds ratio for 
individual sanctions was exp(1.833) = 6.250. This me-
ant that, as compared to the probability of receiving 
cooperative behavior from the individuals having me-
dium levels of trust, in the group facing no sanction, 
the probability of receiving cooperative behavior from 
the individuals having medium levels of trust who were 
facing individual sanctions was 6.250. This was sta-
tistically significant (p-value = .007). The estimated 
odds ratio for collective sanctions was exp(0.297) = 
1.346, meaning that, as compared to the probability 
of receiving cooperative behavior from the individuals 
having medium levels of trust in the group facing no 
sanction, the probability of receiving cooperative be-
havior from the individuals having medium levels of 
trust in the group facing collective sanctions was 1.346. 
This was, however, statistically insignificant (p-value 
= .659). In other words, the probability of receiving 
cooperative behavior from the individuals having me-
dium levels of trust in the group facing collective sanc-
tions was similar to the probability of receiving coo-
perative behavior from the individuals having medium 
levels of trust in the group not subject to sanctions. 
The authors computed a set of “goodness-of-fit” sta-
tistics to evaluate the “model fit”, and have presented 
the results in Table 5. Three “goodness-of-fit” statis-
tics were used to test the null hypothesis, that is to say 
whether the model presented in Table 3 was correct. 
These were the deviance test, the Pearson Chi-Square 
test, and the Hosmer-Lemeshow test. The output was 
a p-value ranging from 0 to 1, with higher values in-
dicating a better “fit”. A p-value of less than a deter-
mined α level (say, .05) indicated that the model was 
not acceptable. A p-value higher than a determined α 
Table 4 
Specification of Design Variables Using “Not Subject to Sanction” Persons, as the Control Group 
Sanction Type Coding 
Design Variable 
D1 D2 
Individual Sanctions Sanction(1) 1 0 
Collective Sanctions Sanction(2) 0 1 
Absence of Sanctions  0 0 
 
Table 5 
Results of “Goodness-of-Fit” Test Statistics 
Methods Value df p-value 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.1519 1 0.283 
Deviance 1.1630 1 0.281 
Hosmer-Lemeshow 1.1519 1 0.283 
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level (say, .05) indicated that the model was accept-
able, or “fit” with the data. The deviance and the Pear-
son Chi-Square “goodness-of-fit” tests examined the 
discrepancy between the current model and the full 
model. The Hosmer-Lemeshow “goodness-of-fit” test 
compared the observed frequencies and the expected 
frequencies of events, and frequencies of non-events, 
to examine how well the model “fit” with the data. 
The deviance and the Pearson chi-square “goodness-
of-fit” tests were used to determine if the predicted pro-
babilities deviated from the observed probabilities, in 
a way not predicted by the bi-nomial distribution. The 
results presented in Table 5 showed that the p-values 
of the “goodness-of-fit” tests (the deviance, and the 
Pearson Chi-Square “goodness-of-fit” tests) were high-
er than the significant level of .05. This meant that the 
predicted probabilities deviated from the observed pro-
babilities, in a way that was not predicted by the bi-
nomial distribution. The Hosmer–Lemeshow test is a 
statistical test for “goodness-of-fit” of logistic regres-
sion models. It is frequently used in risk-prediction mo-
dels. The test assesses whether the observed event ra-
tes match the expected event rates, in the sub-groups 
of the model population. The Hosmer–Lemeshow test 
identifies particular sub-groups as the deciles of fit-
ted risk values. In this study, the models for the expect-
ed and observed event rates in sub-groups were simi-
lar, and, for this reason, were considered to be well ca-
librated. These results implied that the effects of the 
particular sanction type in the model was important 
for the prediction of the probability of cooperative be-
havior. Thus, the model presented in Table 3 “fit” with 
the data. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
In summation, this study was intended to fill the de-
arth of studies into individuals having medium levels 
of trust (these forming the majority of people in soci-
ety), particularly in the context of corruption. The re-
sults in Table 1 show that the percentage of those who 
demonstrated cooperative behavior (54.83%) was high-
er than that of those who exhibited uncooperative be-
havior (45.16%). These finding were in accord with 
the findings from the other studies of individuals ha-
ving high levels of trust, meaning that the tendency 
of individuals having medium levels of trust to behave 
cooperatively, in facing uncertainty and conflict of in-
terests, was similar to the tendency of the cooperative 
behavior of individuals showing high levels of trust  
(Balliet & Van Lange, 2013; Yamagishi, 2011). 
Furthermore, this research investigated the effects 
of different types of sanctions (that is, individual sanc-
tions, collective sanctions, the absence of sanctions) 
on the cooperative behavior, in the context of corrup-
tion, of individuals having medium levels of trust. The 
sanctions in this research were systemic, in which they 
were imposed by the system, and not by the individual 
(see subheading ‘Procedure’ above). Individual par-
ticipants decided whether or not to contribute to the 
sanctioning system. As described previously, in this 
system of sanctions, the term “individual sanctions” 
indicated that the sanctions were to be imposed only 
on participants who chose to engage in uncooperative 
behavior. The term “collective sanctions” indicated 
that the sanctions were to be imposed upon all parti-
cipants in the group, whether they chose to engage in 
uncooperative behavior, or rather chose cooperative 
behavior. The term “absence of sanctions” indicated 
that the participants were not given any information 
relating to sanctions, and that no sanctions were to be 
imposed. It was clear from those understandings, that 
“collective sanctions” forced the participants to con-
sider the group, and other participants in that group. 
In this situation, the participants should have been a-
ware that the risks inherent if they behaved uncoope-
ratively, in other words if they chose not to cooperate, 
were that any sanctions incurred would also apply to 
the other participants in the group, including those who 
had behaved cooperatively. In this way, the partici-
pants who chose to behave cooperatively would suf-
fer sanctions because of the behavior of the “uncoo-
perative” participants, those who chose not to coope-
rate (Chen, Jiang, & Villeval, 2016). The results of 
this study showed that the individuals having medium 
levels of trust, who faced individual sanctions, as well 
as those who faced no sanction, tended to behave co-
operatively. Interestingly, this was not the case when 
they faced collective sanctions. In that situation, they 
tended to display uncooperative behavior (see Table 1). 
These results implied that the participants, who, in this 
study, were considered to be individuals having me-
dium levels of trust, had lower concerns for the group, 
and for other participants in that group. 
In general, the findings indicated that there was a 
significant association between the sanction type and 
cooperative behavior. Regarding the type of sanctions 
imposed upon the participants, who, in this study were 
considered to be individuals having medium levels of 
trust, the results in Table 3 showed that different types 
of sanction resulted in differences in cooperative be-
havior, in the context of corruption. Individual sanc-
tions had a significant effect on cooperative behavior, 
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whereas collective sanctions did not have any detect-
able effect on such behavior. These results suggest-
ed that, in the context of corruption, individual sanc-
tions might well be applied to promote cooperative 
behavior, rather than collective sanctions. These re-
sults indicated a “model fit” with the data. 
The integrative model of decision-making in social 
dilemmas (Parks, Joireman, & Van Lange, 2013) ex-
plains the dynamics of the formation of cooperative 
behavior. Cooperative behavior in this model has four 
stages (the distal causes stage, the proximal causes and 
decision process stage, the initial interaction stage, and 
the consequences of the initial interaction stage.) From 
the perspective of this model, this study described the 
dynamics of cooperative behavior of the individuals 
having medium levels of trust at the proximal causes 
stage, and the decision process stage, resulting in the 
intended stage of the behavior (prior to the initial in-
teraction stage). Therefore, the generalization of the 
results of this study across all of the behavior, in the 
context of corruption, should be performed carefully, 
and should always take into consideration the stages 
in the model. 
Three methods used in making efforts to eradicate 
corruption are preventative, repressive and restorative 
(Rakhmat, 2015). The results of the present study co-
uld be recommended for use in the repressive methods 
for the eradication of corruption, in which trust, as one 
of the individual aspects, should be considered in im-
posing sanctions. Specifically, for individuals having 
medium levels of trust, individual sanctions are shown 
to be more suitable for promoting cooperative beha-
vior, in the context of corruption. 
 
Limitations and Further Study 
 
This present study was conducted on only a relatively 
small number of participants, 75.8% of whom were 
female. Further studies, with more participants, invol-
ving equal numbers of male and female participants, 
are recommended. Regarding responses to sanctions, 
further studies are recommended to be conducted, fo-
cusing on the sensitivity of individuals having medium 
levels of trust regarding their receiving information, 
for example if they are more sensitive to relevant in-
formation about the trustworthiness of others (about 
the extent to which others have credible traits of trust). 
 
Conclusion 
 
The majority of individuals having medium levels 
of trust displays cooperative behavior. There is a sig-
nificant association between sanction type and coo-
perative behavior. The cooperative behavior of indi-
viduals having medium levels of could be promoted, 
by making them subject to individual sanctions. The 
model “fit” with the data. 
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